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Maintenance in the U.S. Navy is officially prescribed to
be accomplished by a three-tiered approach: organizational
level (ship's force), intermediate level (tenders and shore-
based intermediate maintenance activities--SIMAs) , and depot
level (shipyards) . This thesis examines current trends in
the utilization of these levels for maintenance of elec-
tronic equipment. The major objective was to determine the
impact on manpower, training and supply support that an in-
crease in the organizational level's responsibilities would
have. An extensive research effort considered all available
printed material relating to the maintenance systems cur-
rently in use. Interviews with maintenance managers at all
levels of command were conducted at U.S. Navy maintenance
facilities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, San Diego, California,
and Norfolk, Virginia. These interviews addressed general
maintenance topics as well as specifics on eight pieces of
electronic equipment. The major conclusion of this effort
is that given adequate training, proper tools and increased
supply support the organizational level's capabilities are
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Navy's prescribed three-tiered approach to
maintenance accomplishment consists of the organizational
level (ship's force), the intermediate level (tenders and
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities—SIMAs) , and the
depot level (shipyards) . Maintenance actions are identi-
fied as either preventive or corrective. Preventive actions
seek to prevent failure while corrective actions attempt to
repair a failed piece of equipment.
The evolution in electronics from discrete components
to integrated circuits has fostered the implementation of
a modular replacement maintenance philosophy in the event
of failure of equipment for communication, combat and
weapons systems. Pursuit of this philosophy complemented
the decreasing availability, during the 1970 's, of re-
sources. The result of this philosophy has been that the
organizational and intermediate levels are limited to the
performance of only routine preventive maintenance func-
tions and replacement of failed modules, while all correc-
tive maintenance actions on those modules have become a
depot-level-only responsibility. This has threatened, and
continues to threaten, both the operational availability
and the self-sufficiency of today's naval force. The lack

of required skills, tools and parts can only lead to a fur-
ther degradation of these aspects in the fleet.
It is the attempt at prevention of any further degra-
dation that has initiated a reversal to this trend. The
impetus is now to return expanded responsibilities and capa-
bilities for corrective maintenance to the organizational
and intermediate levels. This thesis examines these trends
and the resulting impact on the support establishment. It
was motivated by a request from the Naval Electronic Sys-
tems Command Detachment, Mechanicsburg (NAVELEXDETMECH) , to
determine the extent of current corrective maintenance capa-
bilities of the organizational level.
Chapter II examines the three-tiered approach to main-
tenance and the current trend in the distribution of re-
sponsibilities between the three levels within the U.S.
Navy. Chapter III reviews the structure of the Navy's cur-
rent maintenance organization and the roles played by each
of the organizations involved. Chapter IV evaluates ex-
isting organizational level corrective maintenance capa-
bilities with an emphasis on specific case studies on eight
pieces of electronic equipment of interest to NAVELEXDET-
MECH. Chapter V presents change initiatives which include
the Miniature/Microminiature (2-M) Electronic Repair Pro-
gram, the Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) Evaluation and the
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology. Chap-
ter VI provides the conclusions.
8

Because of the numerous areas that impact on mainte-
nance, this thesis only highlights those in need of review
Further study is required in each area if the U.S. Navy is
to adequately equip forces to fulfill its missions.

II. THE LEVELS OF f^INTENANCE
At one time the state-of-the-art electronic equipment
utilized on all Navy platforms consisted of tubes, capaci-
tors and resistors. Most of this equipment had very similar
construction and could be fairly easily maintained by the
average Navy technician of the time. The thorough training
in troubleshooting techniques and electronic principles
gave the technician the fundamentals necessary to correct
failures. It also fostered a feeling of pride in accom-
plishment and of ownership.
Equipment of this period, with its similarities in con-
struction, permitted a maintenance philosophy that centered
responsibility on the individual platforms and encouraged
the ultimate in maintenance self-sufficiency. Even though
outside assistance was available, its utilization was, by
choice, mostly limited to major overhaul periods. The Navy
maintenance structure was therefore essentially composed of
only two levels: the organizational level and the depot
level. Additionally, the evaluation or development of a
maintenance concept for new equipment was not required nor
was the impact of the maintenance requirements evaluated.
However, as electronic systems became more sophisticated
and tubes became the dinosaurs of electronics, the impact
of new systems began to be felt and the ramifications of
10

ignoring the maintenance issues during the development
phase forced the development of a Navy maintenance philoso-
phy. This was evidenced by the trend away from shipboard
repair toward modular replacement or the "black box" main-
tenance concept.
The development, during the mid 1970 's, of a maintenance
concept for the Navy was necessitated by increasingly so-
phisticated and technically complex systems as well as the
decreasing availability of resources. The new constraints
on resources affected every phase of Navy life from availa-
ble dollars for recruiting and training to the availability
of fuel for deployments. The attempts to adjust to this
austere environment, while the maintenance of the new sys-
tems was requiring higher and higher levels of expertise,
resulted in the development of a maintenance concept which
would consider the need for resources explicitly. This
required the identification and inclusion into the first
phase of design of the support levels, repair policies,
effectiveness measures and logistic support requirements
envisioned for the new system. The purposes of the main-
tenance concept were to:
1. Provide the basis for the establishment of supporta-
bility requirements in system/equipment design.
2. Provide the basis for the establishment of require-
ments for total logistic support.
3. Provide a basis for detailing the maintenance plan
and impacts upon the supply concept, training con-
cept, supplier technical services, phased logistic
11

support, transportation and handling criteria, and
production data needs. [Ref. 1]
Implementation of the concept was accomplished through
the requirements established in MIL-STD-1390A (NAVY) , dated
1 April 1974, the military standard for level of repair
(LOR) analysis, which was superseded by MIL-STD-1390B (NAVY)
on 1 December 1976.
LOR decisions influence the logistic support cost and
system effectiveness of naval material and hence influence
the total life cycle cost of ownership. LOR decisions
also influence the maintenance plan and the ILS (Inte-
grated Logistic Support) elements necessary to maintain
the operational readiness of the hardware system. [Ref. 2]
MIL-STD-1390B requires that the LOR analysis and resulting
decisions be initiated during the preliminary design phase
and continue until the final hardware design had been de-
termined. The LOR analysis ensures that the most economic
maintenance policy for all new systems is developed.
While LOR analysis requirements enhanced awareness of
future maintenance needs, the shortages of resources availa-
ble to provide for the current and projected needs had mo-
tivated a reevaluation in 1973 of how maintenance was
accomplished. As a consequence of this evaluation, a uni-
form maintenance program for electronic material was estab-
lished by the Naval Material Command. It was this policy,
published in NAVMATINST 4790.19 of 4 June 1973, that sought
relief from decreasing resource availability through de-
sign, the premise of which was to remove the responsibili-
ties of repair from the organizational level to the
12

intermediate and the depot levels. At the same time,
savings were sought by lengthening the period between major
overhauls. Accomplishment of this included emphasizing
preventive maintenance as a means of increasing the mean-
time-between-failure and the establishment of mini-overhauls
or scheduled intermediate maintenance availabilities.
This brought about, by the mid-1970 's, an increased
dependence on the intermediate maintenance level. Depen-
dence on the intermediate level was further encouraged by
continued decreased manning and capabilities at the organi-
zational level as well as the "black box" concept of the
Naval Material Command's uniform maintenance progrcun.
A. MAINTENANCE CATEGORIZATIONS
By 1974, the division of labor between the three levels
of maintenance severely restricted the organizational
level's area of responsibility. This is evidenced by the
following description of the three levels of maintenance
taken from NAVMATINST 4700. 4B of 12 August 1974.
Organizational Maintenance . That maintenance which is
the responsibility of and performed by using organiza-
tions on their assigned equipment. Its phases normally
consist of inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjust-
ing and the replacing of parts, minor assemblies and
sub-assemblies
.
Intermediate Maintenance . That maintenance which is the
responsibility of and performed by designated maintenance
activities for direct support of using organizations.
Its phases normally consist of calibration, repair or
replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components,
or assemblies; the emergency manufacture of non-available
13





. That maintenance which is the re-
sponsibility of and performed by designated maintenance
activities to augment stocks of serviceable material and
to support organizational maintenance and intermediate
maintenance activities by the use of more extensive shop
facilities, equipment and personnel of higher technical
skill than are available at the lower levels of main-
tenance. Its phases normally consist of inspection, test,
repair, modification, alteration, modernization, con-
version, overhaul, reclamation or rebuild of parts, as-
semblies, sub-assemblies, components, equipment end items
and weapon systems; the manufacture of critical non-
available parts; and providing technical assistance to
intermediate maintenance organizations, using and other
activities. [Ref. 3]
This scime basic division of responsibilities between main-
tenance levels was perpetuated by the Fleet Commanders in
Chief. The following was taken from COMNAVSURFLANTINST
9000.1 of 12 June 1975.
Organizational (Shipboard) Level Maintenance . Organiza-
tional level maintenance is that maintenance level which
is the responsibility of and performed by the ships force
on assigned equipment. The individual ship shall be self-
sufficient to the maximum degree. The planned maintenance
sub-system, described in the Maintenance and Material
Management {3-M) Manual defines the minimum preventive
maintenance program to be carried out on board the indi-
vidual ship. It is a command responsibility to ensure
that this maintenance is effectively planned, scheduled
and accomplished.
Intermediate Level Maintenance Activity (IMA) . Inter-
mediate level maintenance is that maintenance which is
normally performed by Navy IMA personnel on tenders, re-
pair ships, aircraft carriers, fleet support bases, and
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) . It
normally consists of calibration, repair or replacement
of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or as-
semblies; the emergency manufacture of unavailable parts;
and providing technical assistance to using organizations.
Depot (Shipyard) Level Maintenance . Depot level mainten-
ance is that maintenance performed by industrial activities
14

on material requiring major overhaul or a complete re-
building of parts, assemblies, sub-assemblies, and end
items, including the manufacturing of parts, modifica-
tions, testing and reclamation as required. This is
normally accomplished on ships at commercial facilities
or naval shipyards, including ship repair facilities,
during restricted availabilities, technical availabili-
ties and regular overhauls. [Ref. 4]
Maintenance, as defined by the Navy is " . . . action
taken to retain material in a serviceable condition or to
restore it to serviceability . . ." [Ref. 5]. This leads
to a further categorization of maintenance into preventive
and corrective maintenance. Preventive maintenance is de-
fined as planned maintenance consisting of the periodic
performance of tests, inspections, cleaning and renewing of
operating consumables (i.e., filters or lubricants) on
operable equipment. Corrective maintenance is the accom-
plishment of repairs to inoperable equipment for the purpose
of returning them to operable condition. This includes
diagnosis of the casualty, disassembly, purchase and instal-
lation of repair parts, reassembly and test. [Ref. 6]
The breakdown of responsibility listed earlier restricts
the lowest or organizational level to conducting actions to
retain material in a serviceable condition (preventive
maintenance) while it is the intermediate and the depot
levels that are restoring equipment to serviceability (cor-
rective maintenance) . This division between the activities
of the organization and the other two levels was at one
time viewed as an answer to a shortage of resources. "Black
15

box" technicians required significantly less training and
could support a greater number of equipments. The problem
with corrective maintenance being restricted to the higher
levels of maintenance is that technical self-sufficiency is
degraded. That is not considered as desirable by the Com-
mander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) who, in a
letter dated 25 July 1978, stated that, "It is Navy policy
that fleet activities be technically self-sufficient to the
maximum extent practicable." [Ref. 7]
B. TRENDS IN MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY
Recent correspondence indicates that increasing emphasis
is being placed on restoring the capabilities of the organi-
zational level. In particular, both Fleet Commanders sup-
port the need to restore self-sufficiency to the fleet.
Examples of this shift are contained in their comments to
the draft Navy Training Plans (NTPs) , dated 1981, for four
new systems (AN/KG-84, AN/KW-46, AN/USC-34 and AN/SPA-25);
all of which epitomize the ultimate in a "black box" main-
tenance concept. In the case of the AN/KG-34, organiza-
tional level maintenance was not even mentioned in the NTP
.
The other three systems specify component replacement as
the only organizational requirements. All four totally
disregarded the intermediate level resulting in a two-level
maintenance structure, organizational and depot. The com-
ments of both Fleet Commanders stressed inclusion of the
16

organizational and intermediate levels in the maintenance
plans. The Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(CINCLANTFLT) was the most specific on this issue.
The proposed concept of module replacement only at the
organizational level has proven largely ineffective with
other electronics systems due primarily to non-sparing
of modules and printed circuit boards (PCBs) . The capa-
bility in the fleet to repair PCBs has been established
by necessity through installation of miniature and micro-
miniature (2M) electronic repair stations with appro-
priate numbers of trained personnel. These personnel and
station equipments are inspected annually to ensure a
continuing capability to do depot quality work. Fleet
IMAs are also being equipped with automatic test equip-
ment (ATE) for digital PCBs which allow go/no-go testing
and fault isolation.
In view of the above it is requested that all low
cost LINK 11 equipment be supported on board ship with
documentation and piece parts to support emergency 2M
repair, and that Test Program Sets (TPSs) be developed
for ATE located at IMAs to allow for full fault isolation
and repair of digital PCBs. [Ref. 8]
Similar comments have been submitted on other training
plans that neglected the organizational or intermediate
level capabilities. However, the most recent statement of
policy from the Naval Material Command and the Naval Sea
Systems Command continues to staunchly support repair of
all 2M PCBs and modules, regardless of Source, Maintenance
and Recoverability (SM&R) codes, by the depot level and to
limit the intermediate and organizational levels to normal
repairs of only those PCBs and modules specifically coded
for their level. This limitation almost completely excludes
these two levels from repair due to the very few numbers of
boards coded in this manner. [Refs. 9 & 10]
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This difference in philosophy collided during the Navy
Training Plan Conference held on 8 December 1981 for the
Radar Display and Distribution System (RADDS) . As had been
the practice with other Navy Training Plans (NTPs)
,
CINCLANTFLT submitted comments regarding the inclusion
of the intermediate level into the maintenance plan as
well as extending repair to the piece part level. The
conflict arose when the conference chairman ruled against
such a revision.
. . . the NTPs do not determine the maintenance philoso-
phy, but the maintenance philosophy drives the type of
training. Therefore, as the maintenance has been set by
CNO/CHNAVMAT for all systems to the circuit card level
or lowest replaceable unit (LRU) , that is the planned
maintenance philosophy for the RADDS system. Under the
approved maintenance plan there are two levels, organiza-
tional (circuit card replacement) and depot (repair cir-
cuit cards) . IMA Level repair does not exist in the
apDroved CNO/CHNAVMAT surface fleet maintenance plan ....
[Ref. 11]
The recourse taken by CINCLANTFLT was to confront the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) /CHNAVMAT directly with a
request to change the maintenance philosophy. It was
CINCLANTFLT' s contention that component level repair of
modules only by the depot, and only for modules costing
more than $500, is neither cost effective nor operationally
acceptable. "To throw away a $450 board because of a de-
fective $3.95 integrated circuit is foolish. To reduce the
combat capability of a $100,000,000 ship because the closest
replacement module is undergoing repair at a depot is crimi-
nal, but both examples occur on a regular basis because of
18

today's depot-only repair concept" [Ref. 12]. Recommended
concept changes included:
Organizational level . Authorize onboard repair of modules
where replacement modules are not immediately available.
Provide ships with schematics of modules to enable onboard
fault isolation as required. Also, provide basic kit with
piece parts needed to make repairs.
Intermediate level . Authorize to screen all suspect
modules using ATE, return good PCBs to ship and repair
defective boards. [Ref. 13]
Implementation of CINCLANTFLT' s recommendations would mesh
the systems command's end product with the concept of main-
tenance levels as defined by the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV) in OPNAVINST 4700. 7F of 28 Sep-
tember 1981. This policy statement specifically includes
corrective maintenance as an organizational level responsi-
bility and stresses the need for each platform to be self-
sufficient to the highest degree obtainable.
a. Organizational (Shipboard) Level Maintenance
The first level of maintenance is the Organizational
level consisting of the ship itself and the sailors on
board the ship. Organizational level maintenance is that
corrective and preventive maintenance accomplished by the
ship's crew. . . . The individual ship shall be mainten-
ance self-sufficient to the degree achievable within man-
power and facility constraints.
b. Intermediate Level Maintenance
The next level of maintenance is the Intermediate
level consisting of Tenders, Repair Ships and Shore
Intermediate Maintenance Activities wherein Navy per-
sonnel with specialized facilities and training accom-
plish intermediate level repair work. ... It normally
consists of calibration, repair or replacement of damaged
or unserviceable parts, components or assemblies; the




c . Depot Level Maintenance
Depot level maintenance is that type of maintenance
generally requiring a greater industrial capability than
possessed by either organizational or intermediate level
activities. It consists of that maintenance perforined
by shipyards, either commercial or Navy, on equipment re-
quiring major overhaul or complete rebuild of parts, as-
semblies, subassemblies, end items, and complete platforms
including manufacture of parts. . . . The only work to be
scheduled for accomplishment by depot level maintenance
activities will be because of insufficient time or man-
power or because it is beyond the capabilities of these
fleet maintenance activities .... [Ref. 14]
This return to an emphasis on an organizational level
performing both preventive and corrective maintenance in
no way entails deemphasizing the intermediate or depot
levels but strives only to alleviate a complete dependency
on the latter for corrective maintenance. This action will
increase the purview of the organizational level and will
encourage a partner type relationship between all three
levels. This will enhance the probability that problems
will be resolved at the lowest possible level, significantly
increase the attainable degree of self-sufficiency and in-
crease the efficiency of the three-tiered maintenance
approach. This approach encourages a progression of capa-
bilities with the depot level truly performing only those
tasks requiring an industrial capability.
20

III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY'S MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
The current organizational structure for maintenance
involves a myriad of commands, each having unique responsi-
bilities and motivations for directing maintenance policies
and procedures. These foster duplication of effort, multi-
plicity of philosophies and policies, a lack of a coordina-
tion focal point and the absence of authority for enforcing
or monitoring any or all of the policies promulgated. The
players are so varied that the maintenance arena has become
a classic example of the left hand not knowing or, in some
instances, not caring what the right hand is doing.
This is evident in the divergence from published Navy
maintenance policy that the NAVMAT organization has pur-
sued. As stated previously, OPNAVINST 4700. 7F of 28 Sep-
tember 1981 (which has in previous issues and continues to
be the vehicle for promulgating Department of Defense (DOD)
policy regarding maintenance established by DOD Directive
4151.16 of 30 August 1972) clearly defines the organiza-
tional level maintenance responsibilities to include cor-
rective maintenance. However, NAVMATINST 4790.19 of 4 June
1973, and NAVSEAINST 4790.17 of 7 May 1980, both limit
repair at the organizational and intermediate levels in
favor of depot level repair. The subtlety of accomplishing
this violation of policy is directly related to the faulty
21

economic evaluation of a proposed level of repair and the
subsequent SM&R coding.
This divergence is reinforced by the chasm that sepa-
rates the goals of each organization. OPNAV represents the
operational goal of unit self-sufficiency while NAVMAT rep-
resents the support side which is driven solely by system
support costs. The operators' world is one of immediacy
concerned only with the here and now while the support com-
mands are planners concerned with the future. This dif-
ference in environments further separates their respective
goals.
The surface community exhibits two separate organiza-
tions, each designed to operate under different conditions,
"the operational establishment which is organized for a
wartime environment, while the support establishment is
organized to operate in a peacetime environment" [Ref. 15].
Understanding of the surface communities' weaknesses in
this area requires an examination of the commands involved
in maintenance and their roles.
A. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
The only organization that has overall responsibility
for maintenance is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
.
The remaining commands are only responsible for a specific
portion of the maintenance pie. The supporting systems
commands, under the direction of the Naval Material Command
22

(NAVMAT) , include the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
and the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) . The
operational side consists of the staffs of the Fleet Com-
manders in Chief, the number fleet commanders, the Type
Commanders (TYCOMS) and the units themselves. Discussion
of the unit level's role is the subject of the following
chapter, and will not be included here.
1. Naval Material Command
NAVMAT was chartered to coordinate and oversee the
workings of the systems commands. The purpose of its crea-
tion was to provide a central point of coordination, unifi-
cation and support. However, this has not been evidenced
in the maintenance area. NAVMAT has been neither a coordi-
nator nor a director. The relationship, based on tradition
that has long existed between the systems commands and
their respective OPNAV sponsors is such that NAVMAT has
been almost totally excluded. The establishment of NAVMAT
has been viewed as another layer of bureaucracy which, more
often than not, is circumvented.
2. Naval Sea Systems Command
As one of the systems commands under NAVMAT, NAVSEA
holds the bulk of the responsibility for total ship main-
tenance. It is NAVSEA that manages the designing and ac-
quiring of a new class of ships. This responsibility is
designated to a Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM)
.
Included in the tasks of a SHAPM are the projection of the
23

support requirements and the development of a maintenance
and support plan.
Once the ship is delivered to the fleet, the main-
tenance planning and evaluation responsibilities are trans-
ferred to a NAVSEA Ship Type Directorate where a Ship
Logistics Manager (SLM) is assigned. The SLM's are typi-
cally responsible for more than one ship class and must
divide their available resources between not only the classes
but the many functions they are assigned responsibility for.
The majority of their resources are used in the alteration
or updating of hull, mechanical and electrical equipment.
Assisting the SLM's in the planning and development
of alterations and overhaul packages are the Planners and
Engineers for Repairs and Alterations (PERAs) . The PERAs
serve as a coordinating link between the operational and
support establishments.
NAVSEA also manages surface and submarine weapons
system acquisition, maintenance programs, and alterations
and, in conjunction with the Naval Ship Engineering Center
(NAVSEC)
,
performs engineering and technical analysis.
Finally, the operations of the Navy shipyards,
which are the primary facilities where Navy ships are over-
hauled, and the Navy Supervisors of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS)
,
who administer contracts for work performed by private
yards, are overseen by NAVSEA. This includes providing
administrative services to the yards, long-range overhaul
24





Naval Electronics Systems Command
NAVELEX is responsible for the procurement and sup-
port of electronic equipment, particularly exterior communi-
cations, navigation and intelligence electronics. NAVELEX
oversees all maintenance-related engineering activities,
including securing support for corrective maintenance and
developing technical alterations. Improvements to elec-
tronic equipment may be accomplished during major ship
alterations or through field changes designed to be made
by the organizational level. [Ref. 17]
4 Fleets and Type Commanders
The entire operational side of the U.S. Navy per-
forms maintenance management functions. The fleet com-
manders set policies and procedures, allocate funds and
other resources among the TYCOMs and act as fleet advocates
with OPNAV. The numbered fleet commanders handle day-to-
day logistic needs of their ships while the TYCOMs are
responsible for ensuring the resolution of a given ship's
maintenance problems
.
TYCOM staffs assist in corrective maintenance prob-
lems by securing technical assistance. They oversee repair
work performed in intermediate maintenance activities and
they plan and fund major work packages to be performed
by shipyards. [Ref. 18]
25

5 . The Fourth Level of Maintenance
The failure to provide adequate maintenance planning
has resulted in the need for a type of maintenance assis-
tance that is outside the purview of the three-tiered ap-
proach. Technical Assistance (TA)
,
promoted initially by
the hardware systems commands, fills this void by providing
onboard technical support to the ships by highly qualified
military, civil service or contractor personnel. The ser-
vices of TA's include troubleshooting malfunctioning or
inoperative equipment, providing advice, instruction and
training to the ship's crew; and providing assistance to
ship's force for adjusting, tuning or grooming equipment
in preparation for deployments or exercises. This type of
assistance does not fall under one of the other three cate-
gories (organizational, intermediate, or depot) because it
is an off-ship repair system that goes to the ship and does
not require any special equipment beyond that held by the
customer.
TA is provided by a host of activities. There are
two levels of TA; that provided by the operational or the
fleet chain of command and that provided by the systems
commands.
On the fleet side, TA is provided by Mobile Techni-
cal Units (MOTUs) . MOTUs are shore-based commands headed
by Of f icers-in-Charge. The MOTU organization was established
by the CNO in 1962, through the merger of Mobile Ordnance
26

Service Units and Mobile Electronics Technical Units. The
objective was to increase the reliability and efficiency of
fleet electronics and weapons systems by providing technical
assistance and training to shipboard personnel. Each MOTU
is staffed with a cadre of versatile and highly skilled
senior Navy technicians augmented by civil service person-
nel. MOTU staffs are also augmented with civilian Contrac-
tor Engineering and Technical Services (GETS) personnel
(and, hence, the MOTU ' s became recipients of a form of TA)
.
While the fleet commanders fund the operating costs of the
MOTU, funding for the GETS personnel is provided by the
respective systems command.
Outside the operational chain of command, TA is pro-
vided through the Direct Fleet Support (DFS) program. These
technical services are defined by NAVMATINST 4350.13 as
"those services associated with the installation, operation
and maintenance of aircraft and shipboard weapons, equip-
ments and systems and performed by in-house and contract
personnel qualified and trained in engineering and technical
disciplines." Included are Engineering and Technical Ser-
vices (ETS) which provide advice, instruction and training
in the installation, operation and maintenance of equip-
ments. ETS provided by Navy military and civil service
personnel are termed NETS and those performed by commercial
or industrial companies are the GETS mentioned earlier.
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Both NAVSEA and NAVELEX support field activities for the
purpose of providing TA.
NAVSEA supports the Naval Sea Support Centers
(NAVSEACENs)
.
These centers represent NAVSEA in designated
geographical areas in matters of technical support of ships
systems under their cognizance to ensure adequate fleet
readiness. NAVELEX provides TA through NAVELEX systems
Engineering Centers (NAVSECs) . These centers are involved
with life-cycle support of existing equipment and engineer-
ing design and acquisition of new equipment.
The problems associated with the numerous organiza-
tions providing technical assistance are the same as those
caused by the lack of an overall maintenance structure.
The absence of coordination coupled with an apparent in-
ability to pursue a common objective further degrades
system-wide maintenance effectiveness. Finally, TA ser-
vices are often the same as many of the services available
from the intermediate level facilities and the MOTU ' s . This
duplication was the subject of a Pacific Fleet study to re-
view DFS in the Pacific Basin. The resulting recommenda-
tion of this 1978 study was to eliminate DFS functions from
NAVSEA and transfer all associated resources to the fleet
[Ref . 19] . However, the NAVELEX TA services were not in-
cluded in the proposed transfer. So while consolidation
of some of the services would be accomplished, there would
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still be no single organization responsible for or coordi-
nating the use of technical assistance.
B. AN ADDITIONAL DIMENSION
The Atlantic and the Pacific fleets differ in main-
tenance philosophy. The Pacific structure tends toward
institutionalization of maintenance. Directly responsible
to the Commander in Chief is a quasi-TYCOM, LOGPAC, which
is responsible for all shorebased intermediate maintenance
activities. LOGPAC serves as the focal point for the shore
side of Pacific fleet maintenance efforts but does not
incorporate the afloat side. The latter area of responsi-
bility is placed at a lower level; the respective squadrons
or group staffs which report to the TYCOMs. In contrast,
all maintenance assets in the Atlantic fall under the aus-
pices of the largest TYCOM (SURFLANT) and management is
accomplished by representative Readiness Support Groups
(RSGs) in each major port. The responsibilities of the
RSGs include coordinating requests for assistance from
fleet units. However, this role, as stipulated in the RSGs
mission statement, is not supported by other fleet instruc-
tions delineating procedures to be followed when requesting
assistance. For example; COMNAVSURFLANTINST 9000.1, in-
structs the unit to contact organizations directly when in
need of assistance. If ships company and the MOTU are both
unable to provide assistance then as a last resort, a
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request is submitted to the RSG. This often results in the
ship requesting assistance from more than one source and
representatives of all sources arriving to provide assis-
tance. This implicit lack of support of the RSG by SURFLANT
encourages even further disorder in the delivery of tech-
nical assistance.
Although in the best position to provide it, current
fleet organizational structures do not exhibit the requisite
capabilities for coordinating and supporting increased or-
ganizational maintenance and intermediate level activities.
Maintenance activities should be consolidated into one chain
of command within the fleets to provide coordination and the
most effective utilization of assets. This consolidation
would reduce the duplication of skills and enhance optimal
distribution of the workload.
C . SUMMARY
This overview of the current maintenance structure
clearly supports the need for change. The elements required
to provide the lacking coordination do exist. The strength-
ening of the NAVMAT organization, or establishment of some
similar group, to coordinate and enforce the pursuit of a
single maintenance concept would enhance the systems com-
mand's final product. This coupled with an increased em-
phasis on bridging the gap between the operators and the
planners would solidify a one Navy maintenance concept.
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The resolution of the "conflict" between a need for self-
sufficiency and the need for economic systems acquisition
must support the acceptance of organizational level main-
tenance, as defined by OPNAVINST 4700. 7F, to include cor-
rective as well as preventive maintenance functions.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL CAPABILITIES
Organizational level capabilities hinge on the quality
of training, available resources (personnel as well as
spare parts) and the maintenance policy directed. In-
creasing the organizational level's role will greatly impact
each of these areas. Implementation of the current trend
in maintenance philosophy requires an evaluation of what
adjustments will be needed. Opponents of this trend argue
that today's average Navy technician is probably not capa-
ble of mastering the skills required to accomplish the en-
visioned organizational level repair and that, even if he/
she could, it is not cost effective to invest the necessary
dollars to provide the additional training needed to develop
these skills.
In many cases a cursory economic analysis would probably
give credence to such a claim. However, in the case where
the defense of a nation is at stake, a cursory economic
analysis neglects the most important factor, operational
availability.
Regardless of the tested reliability of a system, when
it fails it must be repaired. Reliance on a "black box"
maintenance concept with only depot level support reduces
the obtainable degree of self-sufficiency. During peacetime
operations the inability to restore a failed system may not
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be associated with severe consequences. But under other
than peacetime conditions the same failure may be cata-
strophic. In essence, the war might be lost for want of
one printed circuit board. When deployed, the technician's
priority should be to keep the equipment operational no
matter what the maintenance plan details. The peacetime
disregard for this fact has resulted in a level of skills
which are insufficient to do the needed repairs. If such
were attempted, the consequence could possibly lead to the
equivalent of 10 years of wear or even more costly damage.
Weighing this cost plus the cost of decreased operational
availability against the cost of increasing the organiza-
tional level's capabilities should easily lend support to
the desirability of the latter. With this contention in
mind, the impacts on training and resource availability will
be examined.
Since Navy electronic equipment is rapidly becoming
predominately microelectronic, increased repair capability
at the organizational level will be centered on the repair
of circuit boards or assemblies involving or containing inte-
grated circuits. This repair capability has been titled the
Miniature/Microminiature (2M) Electronic Repair Program.
The Navy consists of three different platform types;
air, submarine and surface. The first, air, has taken the
lead in reliability-centered maintenance techniques and 2M
repair by the intermediate level. Because of this advanced
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state, no further discussion of this community's maintenance
policy is deemed necessary except to emphasize that expanded
responsibilities at the organizational and intermediate
levels have been implemented successfully in this community
since approximately 1970. [Ref. 20]
The submarine and surface communities adopted a dif-
ferent approach to these technological advances. Although
the modular replacement philosophy may not have been a
planned approach it was a partial solution to many of the
pressures of the early 1970 's. This theory was voiced by
Mr. Genovese, NAVMAT-04B, on 25 July 1980:
There was no 'decision' to go to modular replacement,
rather it was the technology drive toward more and more
capability and sophistication supported by the semi-
conductor industry combined with the pressures to reduce
ship manning. Additionally, production techniques had to
change as the technology moved from discrete components
to transistors to integrated circuits to large scale inte-
gration. So, it was not a conscious, deliberate move but
an evolution in a world of competing pressures. [Ref. 21]
Although both communities adopted a modular repair
philosophy, there are major differences in the methodology.
Because of the obvious differences in size and operational
requirements, the relationships between the surface unit
and its IMA and the submarine and its IMA bear little re-
semblence to each other. The submarine repair requirements
closely resemble those of the air community. When deployed,
the primary task of all personnel is watchstanding. Sub-
marine organizational level capabilities are limited to
modular replacement by the characteristics inherent to the
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platform. Space and personnel are not available to accom-
plish electronic repair; this becomes the responsibility
of the IMA (Tender). As a consequence, a definite division
of roles exists between the organizational level and the
intermediate level in the submarine community. The sub-
marine tender has the capability to repair electronic equip-
ment and is stocked to support unit level parts requirements
In contrast, the relationship between a surface ship
and its tender or a shore IMA is not clearly defined. The
repair capabilities of a surface ship are bound only by
personnel limitations. The intermediate level usually has
a wider spectrum of specific skills or NECs (Navy Enlisted
Classifications) and acts as a supplement to the unit level
rather than a separate entity.
Improvement of the organizational capabilities in the
submarine community are not viewed as an issue and will not
be addressed. However, the issues of training and resource
availability which will be discussed in conjunction with
increased unit level capabilities in the surface community
are, in general, pertinent to the submarine community and
improvements should be equally beneficial.
One of the initial objectives of this thesis was to
investigate, at the request of the NAVELEX Detachment,
Mechanicsburg, the organizational and intermediate level
capabilities with regard to eight specific pieces of elec-
tronic equipment. Through on-site visits and interviews
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with maintenance personnel from all levels at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii, San Diego, California, and Norfolk, Virginia, span-
ning both the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets, the related
existing capabilities and weaknesses were identified.
Discussion of these findings will commence with the
common problems, which were highlighted above, of personnel
shortages, lack of adequate parts support and inadequate
training. This discussion will be followed by the indi-
vidual case studies.
A. TRAINING AND RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
Manpower and money limitations, as well as a rapidly
changing technology, have induced the modular replacement
philosophy of maintenance. Training to replace boards has
resulted in up to a 60 percent reduction in some school
lengths over that of the preboard era. Training of basic
skills and troubleshooting techniques, both of which are
required to do piece part repair on these boards, would
obviously increase school lengths with a corresponding sig-
nificant cost increase. However, it is the opportunities
lost to save these dollars that must be analyzed.
Currently, the number of repairs attempted at the unit
level are directly proportional to the technician's motiva-
tion factor. Regretfully, the highly motivated technician
may soon become very disillusioned. Having been sent to
the fleet unequipped with the basic skills required to make
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repairs, the extra effort exerted may do no more than in-
crease frustration and discourage the putting forth of that
little extra. The cost of this is job dissatisfaction and
eventual loss to the Navy of the technician.
Not all the equipment in the fleet is digital with inte-
grated circuits. Analog, discrete transistors and tubes
will continue to be used for some time to come. However,
today's technician is in no way prepared to work on this
type of equipment. The return to teaching basic electronic
skills would more adequately prepare the technician to
handle repairs regardless of the technology of the equipment
A high degree of specialization is also prevalent in
today's Navy. This specialization has reached the point
where one system may require several specially skilled
technicians. Disadvantages of this degree of specializa-
tion are not only limited to the high cost of separate
training sequences, but also, as observed by the Manpower
System Study team of the Maintenance System Development
Program (which is addressed further in Chapter V) in August
1977, "... this specificity is highly susceptible to
obsolescence and complicates the assignment process. In
addition, ship configurations are sufficiently different so
that successive ship tours are likely to present the indi-




Another shortcoming of the modular replacement philoso-
phy is the lack of supply support. The greater the relia-
bility of a system the greater the probability that the part
will not be available in the supply system when you need it.
This encourages cannibalization and hoarding, both of which
further degrade the effective operation of this system.
The overwhelming opinion in the fleet is that the supply
system does not adequately support modular replacement and
circumvention of the system is required to obtain any level
of adequate support. The weakness of this system has been
compounded by higher-than-expected random failure rates and
a multiplicity of circuit boards. A stock system based on
demand history can not possibly support today's state-of-
the-art equipment as reported by the NAVMAT Modular Philo-
sophy Study on 1 July 1981:
When faced with inoperative equipment and no readily
available supply support, ships force will attempt re-
pair—even if ill-equipped and insufficiently trained.
Modularity and Shop Replaceable Unit (SRU) design philo-
sophy appears to be nearly universal for maintenance of
new shipboard combat, control and communications equip-
ment. These systems were generally not intended to be
repaired on board beyond the removal and replacement of
component modules. The number of different modules in
each system combined with infrequent and random module
failures, however, makes the stockage of adequate re-
placements based on demand history very difficult. The
result is often logistic delays and reduced system
availability. [Ref. 23]
B. CASE STUDIES
The results of the following case studies highlight the
problem areas addressed previously, as well as the poor flow
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of information that exists today. The case study format
will be: (1) a statement of the problem as perceived by
NAVELEXDETMECH
, (2) a summary of the interviews with knowl-
edgeable maintenance personnel; this serves as background
information leading to, (3) a consensus of the fleet for
a recommended resolution of the problem.
1. AN/WRR-7
PROBLEM ; The AN/WRR-7, more commonly known as the
VERDIN, is a submarine radio receiver. It is a relatively
old design, with an Equipment Dictionary (EDICT) entry date
of 1969, and contains over 100 different circuit boards,
only six of which are carried as authorized spares. With
that many modules, the system would appear to be difficult
to troubleshoot, particularly since the self-diagnostics
can only go down to identifying a group of two or three
modules. With only six spares available, one of which might
not even be the one needed, it was suspected that a large
demand would exist for replacement boards. However, this
has not been the case. The question then became, "Are the
boards being obtained from unauthorized sources?"
BACKGROUND: Discussions were held with the follow-
ing personnel:
NAME
ETCS (SS) P. Eichel
SNC (SS) D. Holtom
ENS B. Manning
LT G, R. Geithmann















The concensus was that the Verdin is a very reliable
piece of equipment with few problems. The diagnostic tapes
are very good and fault isolation is easily accomplished.
After the problem has been narrowed down to three boards
,
a simple swapping procedure is utilized to identify the bad
card. This procedure is aided by the duplication of cards
that exists, which permits cards to work in over 25 loca-
tions. It is also possible to maintain operation of the
Verdin without all of the cards being 100 percent functional
Since introduction of the Verdin into the fleet,
field changes have resulted in correction of initial design
problems and weaknesses. Examples include a defective PM-5
card and the magnetic programming tape unit. The original
connectors on the unit were very fragile and easily damaged.
The high failure rate of this unit was not predicted and
was the cause of extended downtime. However, a field change
that strengthened the connectors partially corrected this
problem and, coupled with proper care, the new connectors
have significantly decreased the failure rate.
The defective PM-5 card caused the crypto alarm
light to stay on, but in no way interfered with the actual
operation of the equipment. Replacement of this PM-5 card,
by Collins Radio, is currently underway. An interesting
fact is the way in which this problem was finally docu-
mented. Although existing since introduction, the fact that
operations were not hindered resulted in the fleet ignoring
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the crypto alarm light malfunctioning. It was not until
the commissioning of the USS San Francisco (SSN-711) , ap-
proximately twelve years after fleet introduction of the
Verdin, when the Commanding Officer refused to sign release
from the shipyard until the crypto alarm light malfunction
was corrected, that the faulty PM-5 card was discovered.
It is expected that new problems will begin to sur-
face, such as failure of the programming tape itself, from
normal wear-and-tear as age begins to take its toll.
RECOMMENDATION : Fault isolation would be enhanced
if extender cards were available. These cards attach to
the actual equipment cards and enhance accessibility to the
circuit boards. The technician can easily see the extender
card which is diagnosing what the respective circuit board
is doing. The need for these cards is particularly great
at the intermediate maintenance level.
2. AN/BRD-7
PROBLEM ; The AN/BRD-7 is a submarine radio; its
antenna is connected through a fitting on the ship's hull.
Because of this connection it is obvious that the organiza-
tional level can not do repairs while deployed so the ques-
tion of the proper level of maintenance was addressed.





ENS B. Manning USS McKEE (AS-41) PACIFIC
Mr. J. B. Williams NESEC San Diego PACIFIC
CDR J. Burritt USS EMORY LAND (AS-39) ATLANTIC
LT B. Welch MOTU-2 NORFOLK ATLANTIC
It was agreed on that, in view of the hull connec-
tion and the exterior cables, the BRD-7 can not be worked
on at sea. Any rework needs a crane which further supports
maintenance accomplishment at the intermediate level. It
was noted that this equipment has some chronic problems but
none that are difficult to repair. Therefore, intermediate
level repair is accomplished to the extent allowed. The
requirement currently exists for any internal antenna main-
tenance to be done by the depot. It was suggested that,
with the appropriate documentation, authorization and parts,
the intermediate level could do any required repairs.
RECOMMENDATIONS : Revise the maintenance plan to
allow the intermediate level to do all repairs on the
AN/BRD-7 antenna. Provide the appropriate documentation
and parts to the IM level.
3. AN/WLR Family
PROBLEM: NAVELEX fleet maintenance representatives
support repair by the organizational level. The question
is whether or not the capability exists at the organiza-




BACKGROUND : Discussions were conducted with the
following personnel:
NAME ORGANIZATION FLEET
LCDR R. Tudor SIMA, PEARL HARBOR PACIFIC
ENS B. Manning USS McKEE (AS-41) PACIFIC
r4r. E. Miller NESEC , SAN DIEGO PACIFIC
LT B. Welch MOTU-2 NORFOLK ATLANTIC
CDR J. Burritt USS EMORY LAND (AS-39) ATLANTIC
The AT^WLR Family consists of Electronic Warfare
systems for both submarine and surface units. These sys-
tems provide emission detection capabilities. The two
specific systems investigated were the AN/WLR-1 and the
AN/WLR-6. Lack of parts support was the predominate prob-
lem as viewed by those interviewed. Apparently the poor
parts support for the AN/WLR-6 is caused by the fact that
it is being phased out, while the AN/VJLR-1 is in the process
of being overhauled to extend its life to the FY-88 time
frame. The impression gleaned was that the organizational
level in the surface fleet was quite capable of maintaining
both systems if the necessary parts could be obtained. How-
ever, circuit board repair is not within the submarines'
organizational level capabilities and, as such, requires
the intermediate level to do the repair.
The AN/WLR-1 was introduced in 19587 it has under-
gone so many modifications that most operating units are
not sure what series they have. The AN/WLR-1 is, due to
age and use, in terrible condition and is a constant source
of problems. Planned replacement by the AN/SLQ-32 has
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suffered so many slippages in delivery date that the cur-
rent VJLR-1 rework program had to be initiated. A contract
has been granted to Jonathan Corporation to refurbish it
and provide parts support.
The major problem unit is the CV-74 1/742 which is
a signal converter. It was planned to replace these with
the CV-3599; an initial purchase was made of 50. Instal-
lation of the new converter has been credited with reducing
the total system corrective maintenance by 80 percent. A
primary problem is that, once the new unit was proven and
the decision was made to replace all the CV-741/742 ' s, no
money was available for purchase of the additional units
required.
RECOMMENDATION ; On the premise that Jonathan Cor-
poration will fulfill their 'contract, no recommendation is
deemed necessary.
4. PP-6241/U
PROBLEM : The PP-6241/U is a power supply unit used
with a radio for short-haul communications. This particular
power supply enables the radio to be remotely powered. The
problem is that demand information indicates that the or-
ganizational unit is ordering the next higher assembly, the
entire power pack, instead of replacing failed parts, such
as the rechargeable batteries, within the power pack.





Mr. J. B. Williams NESEC, SAN DIEGO PACIFIC
LCDR R. Tudor SIMA, PEARL HARBOR PACIFIC
The power pack itself works well and, overall,
causes very few problems. (Mr. Williams observed that the
companion transmitter-receiver, the RT-0524/VRC-46 , was
actually the subject of more casualty reports.) However,
a problem does exist relative to the rechargeable batteries.
The battery charger was extremely difficult for one organi-
zational unit to get and, once they did get it, the charger
failed to work. The charger is managed by the Army and was
apparently never meant to be used aboard ship. There is
also a fear that, if recharging were possible, the charger's
lack of safety features could easily cause an explosion and
lead to serious injury and damage. The organizational
level's remedy for this equipment fault has been the order-
ing of the next higher assembly.
RECOMMENDATION : Make batteries a replaceable item
or provide a battery charger that works and is safe.
5. RT-859A/APX-72
PROBLEM: The RT-859A/APX-72 is a transponder set
that is used on both ships and aircraft. The inventory
manager is the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , which means
that requisitions for parts from ships are sent to ASO via
SPCC. ASO views non-aviation requests from the Navy in
the same way as it does those from other services. Thus,
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ASO may cancel the request on the basis that SPCC failed
to properly forecast ship demands. The ability to properly
predict demand becomes increasingly important and raises
the issue of the repair capabilities of the fleet with re-
gard to this transponder set.
BACKGROUND ; Discussions were held v/ith the follow-
ing personnel:
NAME ORGANIZATION FLEET
Mr. R. Giarrantana NAVELEX (Code 821) N/A
LT B. Welch MOTU-2 NORFOLK ATLANTIC
According to Lt. Welch, the RT-859A/APX-72 is very
difficult to troubleshoot and few surface technicians have
the training required to repair it. However, he could not
recall parts support as being a problem; it was Mr.
Giarrantana that provided information regarding this aspect.
Apparently, at one time, ASO managed only the air side,
while NAVELEX managed the surface side. This was accom-
plished through the use of different stock numbers; ASO
used the National Item Identification Number (NUN) and
NAVELEX used a temporary stock number (HCO) . This worked
well for projecting requirements but failed to support
surface units when requesting replacement parts. Ships
would use the ASO stock number instead of the HCO number,
and turn in a carcass to ASO but were never assured of
getting a replacement in "A" condition. Due to this
failure and the push toward a one-item, one-manager concept.
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ASO was appointed as the manager. Unfortunately, ASO does
not seem interested in providing the Navy's non-aviation
customers with the same service as aviation customers.
RECOMMENDATION ; ASO should modify their forecasting
model to include surface requirements in accordance with the
responsibilities of an item manager.
6. CU-937/UR
PROBLEM ; The CU-937/UR is an antenna coupler used
with the WRC-1 radio set. This particular coupler has
been in use for several years. Corrosion prevention is ac-
complished by filling the housing with an inert gas which
requires a seal to prevent leakage. The problem appears to
be that the organizational level is not capable of reseal-
ing it after maintenance.
BACKGROUND ; Discussions were held with the follow-
ing personnel:
NAME ORGANIZATION FLEET
LT R. Sargent NAVCAMS EASTPAC PACIFIC
LT R. Quijada NAVCAMS EASTPAC PACIFIC
LCDR R. Tudor SIMA, PEARL HARBOR PACIFIC
Mr. J. B. Williams NESEC, SAN DIEGO PACIFIC
LT B. WELCH MOTU-2 NORFOLK ATLANTIC
The inner workings of the CU-9 37/UR are predominate-
ly mechanical. The technician must not only have electronic
skills but must also be somewhat mechanically inclined. It
is often much easier to order the next higher level assembly
than to attempt repair. This solution is reinforced by
the difficulty associated with resealing. An improper seal
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leads to corrosion, and there is difficulty in having equip-
ment available to test the seal. The representatives of
NAVCAMS EASTPAC's Consolidated Maintenance Office (CMO)
felt that smaller ships without the luxury of a machine
shop have no capability to test the seal, while Lt. Welch
and the representatives of SIMA, PEARL HARBOR both con-
curred that facilities were available at the MOTU's and
the SIMA's for ships requiring this capability and, as
such, did not view resealing as that much of a problem.
However, these facilities are only available when in port.
In an attempt to resolve the problem, two field
changes have been developed. The first permitted sealing
and then pressurizing but the problem then became one of
overpressurizing and popping the seal. The second change
was a kit (NSN: 4820-00-054-7713) which permitted the use
of a tee and a pressure relief valve on a common port. The
kit was to be available in August 1978. However, after
purchase, the kits disappeared and the supply system is
unable to locate them for distribution.
RECOMMENDATION : Provide fleet with field change
kit (NSN 4820-00-054-7713) either by locating the lost lot
or through a new purchase,
7. AN/PRC-56
PROBLEM : The AN/PRC-56 is a receiver helmet that
was originally purchased in 1970. It is used on the flight
deck of an aircraft carrier by the "yellow shirts" or
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supervisors. There are normally fifteen to twenty in use
during flight operations. The purpose of the helmet is to
permit communication with the air boss in the "tower" and
the flight deck officer. The unit consists of pop-out re-
placement modules. Due to what appeared to be an extremely
high demand for the entire unit, the question was raised
as to whether attempts were being made to salvage working
modules before turn-in.
BACKGROUND : Discussions were held with the follow-
ing personnel:
NAME ORGANIZATION FLEET
LT R. Sargent NAVCAI^S EASTPAC PACIFIC
LT G. Manuel NAVCOMMSTA SAN DIEGO PACIFIC
LT B. Welch MOTU-2 NORFOLK ATLANTIC
Lt. Sargent and Lt. Welch both agreed that the PRC-
56 is inundated with problems. Because the helmets are
used by flight operations personnel, ship's company does
not claim ownership which greatly reduces their motivation
to maintain the PRC-56. The design is poor; modules run
hot and have a very short life expectancy. The alignment
is impossible to maintain after minimal use and realignment
is an extremely time-consuming job. Additionally, parts
support is nearly non-existent; maintenance training is
hard to get and if obtained, the value of it is questiona-
ble; the technical manuals are not useful and the test
equipment is nearly impossible to obtain. The frustration
that these problems induce, coupled with the total lack of
49

system support of the unit, justifies ordering the entire
helmet.
Lt. Manuel had a completely different view. Taking
into consideration the treatment received, the radio per-
forms well. According to Lt. Manuel, the system requires
return of the entire helmet in return for a replacement
rather than just by parts. He suggested that if the ship
developed a good maintenance program the bulk of problems
associated with the unit could be overcome. The suggested
maintenance program includes hoarding of good parts and
building bad helmets to return to the system in exchange
for the replacements. Additionally, a rigorous training
program is required to ensure that an adequate onboard
skill level is maintained.
RECOMMENDATION : In view of the many problems and
the extraordinary efforts required to overcome them, it is
felt that the most beneficial action would be to provide




As is evidenced by every case study the infoinnation
feedback system is not adequate for problem diagnosis. In
each case, the problem, as interpreted by the support es-
tablishment, was actually a symptom. The ordering of the
next higher assembly is not a result of lacking the
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capability to repair but of lacking the proper equipment,
parts or skills. This was true in the case of the AN/WLR-1
and the AN/WLR-6 which have both suffered from poor parts
support, the PP-6241/U which has rechargeable batteries but
not a functional charger, the CU-9 37/UR which without the
proper testing equipment cannot be resealed and the AN/PRC-
56 which lacks parts support, training, test equipment,
technical manuals and durability. In the case of the
AN/BRD-7 it is only the physical limitations of the sub-
marine that restricts the organizational level's capabili-
ties while the intermediate level is restricted only by
the SM&R coding which dictates shipping to the depot for
repair. In contrast, the AN/WRR-7 is an example of the
organizational level accomplishing fault isolation beyond
the level for which they are equipped. The organizational
level has developed a means to surpass system diagnostics
by utilizing the redundant features of the receiver to
fault isolate to a single component. VJith the assistance
of the IM level's 2-M capabilities the bad component can
frequently be repaired, further reducing demand for re-
placement boards.
It is evident that the resources available at the or-
ganizational level are not being fully utilized. The
modular replacement philosophy has led to an underrating
of organizational-level skills which has, in turn, lessened
the unit technician's responsibilities and greatly decreased
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the challenge and the satisfaction available. Factors
such as these decrease the technician's motivation which
adversely impacts performance leading to the reinforcement
of a "swapping out" instead of a repair maintenance concept.
Breaking this vicious circle requires the return of chal-
lenge to the technician's job and of providing the funda-
mental skills necessary to meet that challenge. This is the
only way that self-sufficiency of platforms can be guaran-
teed. Technicians at the organizational level have the
required capabilities. When provided with adequate train-
ing, skills, spare parts, test equipment and technical
manuals, their only maintenance constraint will be that
inherent to the physical limitations of their platfoirm.
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V. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE
New initiatives that will serve as partial solutions to
the Navy's maintenance needs consist of the 2-M program sup-
ported by the Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) Evaluation and
the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) initiative. ATE
consists of the test equipment and test program sets which
allow fault isolation of the PCB's down to the piece part
level while 2-M provides the tools and the skills necessary
to repair the PCB. RCM is a methodology for developing a
"total" ship maintenance plan. These programs will more
adequately equip the organizational and intermediate levels
to do repairs but in no way are substitutes for basic skill
training.
The necessity for the additional capabilities is not
limited to a changing maintenance philosophy but is also
driven by the change to the stock fund concept for certain
modules. Built-in tests and self-diagnostics are relied on
to isolate failures down to usually three boards. Under
the old supply concept, all three boards could be turned
in at no cost to the unit and three new ones issued. The
stock fund concept forces the unit to purchase replacement
boards. The reaction from the fleet has been a strong de-
sire to avoid these purchases and to attempt repair. Pro-
viding units with the tools required to do these repairs
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appears to be delayed only by an official policy decision
that details the approach to be taken.
A. 2-M PROGRAT'I AND ATE
The NAVMAT Modular Philosophy study, referenced pre-
viously, examined the possible approaches to modular repair
and developed four alternatives, which v/ere:
1. Provide the fleet with modular repair capability.
2. Provide the fleet with a modular screening capability
3. Provide the fleet with a selective modular repair
capability.
4. Provide the SIMAs with a screening/repair capability.
The study ' s recommendation was not to support any alterna-
tive because of a perceived need for further documentation.
While the direction of the 2-M program and the ATE program
is contingent on the alternative selected, the delays in
determining this policy have not halted the progress of
either program. Regardless of which alternative is chosen,
there will exist a need for 2-M and ATE.
The alternative selection also depends on the results
of two other studies. The first is the Support and Test
Equipment Engineering Program (STEEP) Pilot Automatic Test
Equipment (ATE) Evaluation sponsored by NAVSEA. STEEP '
s
objective is to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness and the
practicality of technicians testing and repairing elec-
tronic modules and PCB ' s using ATE. STEEP is responsible
for developing the policies and procedures for screening
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electronic modules at the organizational and intermediate
levels of maintenance. Pilot facilities at Norfolk, Vir-
ginia and San Diego, California have successfully proven
the value of the program.
Unfortunately, each model/PCB requires a unique test
program set (TPS) for fault isolation. Development of these
programs is costly because it is time consuming. The lack
of a large number of different programs currently limits
the effectiveness of the program. For example, a system,
which is composed of over 200 different boards, may cur-
rently have only programs for 30.
An additional problem is the lack of standardization
and control. The STEEP program has not resulted in the
selection of one model tester for all Navy uses. Instead,
individual project managers are pursuing system specific
test equipment.
There is not a management reporting system to prevent one
project manager from procuring the same ATE, under a dif-
ferent contract as another project manager is procuring.
In the same way, nothing prevents a PM from developing a
new ATE requirement that could in fact be met by an
existing piece of ATE. Without a coordinated ATE manage-
ment system, proliferation of models will occur. [Ref. 24]
The second study, also sponsored by NAVSEA, that will
have major impact on the level of repair policy decision
consists of proposed tests to be conducted on selected
DD-963's. The onboard module repair capability for digital
PCBs of the MK86 Gun Fire Control System (GFCS) will be
assessed with the objective of validating the anticipated
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advantages of expanding the organizational level's capa-
bilities. Two ships (one on each coast) equipped with test
equipment, piece-part spares and documentation will perform
onboard module repair over a one-year period. The techni-
cians on these "module repair" ships will be provided with
everything required for piece-part repair except training
in fault isolation. The quality of repairs and the dov/n-
time will be measured. The maintenance performance on these
two ships will be compared with that from a second set of
two ships which will serve as the controls and will continue
to use the present maintenance concept. [Ref . 25]
The test will also assess the ramifications and impact
on training, documentation, sparing and should shed light
on the personnel requirements issue. With the high relia-
bility and low failure rate of new systems, increases in
manpower should not be required.
B. RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE
The far reaching implications that maintenance issues
have on all phases of readiness has resulted in an increased
awareness and elevation in importance of maintenance prac-
tices, policy and procedures. This increased emphasis was
officially acknowledged in the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Objective #3 [Ref. 26] entitled, "Improvement of
Material Condition of Ships in the Fleet," within which it
was established that a major Navy priority was to develop
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a program to promote an early improvement in the fleet '
s
material condition. Achievement of CNO Objective #3 con-
sisted of establishing the Ship Support Improvement Project
(PMS 306) within the Naval Sea Systems Command, with a
charter to undertake improvements for both the short and
long term. It was through this effort that the Maintenance
System Development Program (MSDP) came into being during
1977.
The goal of the MSDP was defined as helping the Navy
improve ship maintenance functions to attain and maintain
a specified realistic level of ship and equipment material
readiness at least total cost. The MSDP initiative signi-
fies the high level of importance that is being placed on
maintenance. For the first time, maintenance requirements
are to be developed and justified on system life cycle
basis rather than being based solely on procurement costs.
This reevaluation process is closely tied to the redistri-
bution of responsibilities between the three levels of
maintenance discussed previously, and the observed trend to
increase the organizational level capabilities.
In view of the fact that ship maintenance consists of
such a wide variety of functions and activities, the MSDP
was undertaken as a multi-year, integrated study which would
examine and recommend improvements to the many interlinked
components of the Navy maintenance system. A major part
of the study was conducted through a contract awarded to
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American Management Systems, Incorporated (AMS) in Arling-
ton, Virginia. The fundamental objective of AMS ' s MSDP was
to address the primary components of an integrated mainten-
ance system. One of these components consists of the ini-
tial process of determining requirements, which includes
developing preventive maintenance plans, identifying proba-
ble corrective maintenance actions, recommending equipment
redesign related to safety and mission requirements, and
estimating initial maintenance resource requirements.
1. PMS Versus RCM
Economic pressures of the 1970 's contributed to de-
creases in initial training, reduced manning levels and in-
creased periods between overhauls. These factors motivated
an increased emphasis on the Planned Maintenance Sub-system
(PMS) of the Ship's Maintenance and Material Management
(3-M) System which was introduced in the fleet in 1963.
The goal of this detailed management system was to maximize
the accomplishment of planned maintenance through the use
of technically approved maintenance standards. However, by
the early 1970 's the general consensus was that the U.S.
Fleet did not meet an acceptable standard of operational
availability. Contributing to this impression was the fact
that fleetwide implementation of PMS had not resulted in a




A twofold effort was initiated in an attempt to
remedy the situation. The first was a request by the Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, in 1973, and endorsed
by the Chief of Naval Operations, that the Navy Manpower
and Material Analysis Center, Pacific (NAVMACPAC) conduct
a study on various aspects of the Pacific Fleet 3-M Program.
This study was to examine various aspects of the program,
determine problem areas and recommend solutions to enhance
fleet material readiness [Ref . 28] . The second was to
analyze equipment maintenance requirements and develop a
methodology for the determination of necessary scheduled
maintenance to be performed by a ship's crew. This second
effort was the subject of a subcontract issued by Al-lS to
the Lockheed-California Company.
The findings of the NAVMACPAC study almost exclu-
sively centered on poor administration of the program by
the Type Commanders and management ineffectiveness at the
shipboard level [Ref. 29] . The bottom line was that PMS
specified tasks were not being done. As understood by this
author, the tasks specified in PMS were based on technically
approved standards provided by the contractor with no sup-
porting documentation as to the validity of the tasks or
the frequency with which they should be performed. Finally,
a direct correlation was found between absolute neglect of
PMS scheduled tasks and unacceptable material readiness,
although none was found between selective non-accomplishment
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and unacceptable material readiness. This fact led to the
conclusion that time spent completing tasks which had no
impact on operational availability was time wasted and that
maximum maintenance effectiveness will best be achieved
through the limiting of scheduled maintenance tasks to those
that directly affect the operational availability of the
platform. Additionally, it was observed by Lockheed-
California that:
Every maintenance action carries the potential of de-
creasing, rather than increasing, resistance to failure.
Reducing the exposure of an equipment to unnecessary
maintenance increases its operational reliability. Every
potential maintenance action should be assessed carefully
to ensure that it is likely to do more good than harm
before it is adopted. [Ref. 30]
The issue was therefore not the existence of a scheduled
maintenance program, but the philosophy behind content de-
termination. PMS was designed using the philosophy that
if an equipment is to be maintained a set of scheduled
maintenance requirements should be established [Ref. 31],
As it is currently structured, PMS provides each unit with
a set of scheduled requirements and the means to schedule,
control and perform those requirements. Procedures for
accomplishing each action are described on Maintenance Re-
quirement Cards (MRCs) , which also specify the skills and
man-hours needed. The procedure for determining these re-
quirements included an engineering review of the manufac-




In contrast, the RCM strategy for the development
of a maintenance program was to provide a methodology for
validating the contents. The logic employed systematically
determines: "(1) the need for scheduled maintenance;
(2) the effectiveness of potential scheduled tasks from an
engineering standpoint; and (3) the cost-effectiveness of
potential scheduled tasks" [Ref. 32]. Therefore, a task
will be scheduled only if it will prevent future failure
and the benefit outweighs the cost. Thus, an RCM mainten-
ance program for the Navy would have two objectives:
1. Preservation of the inherent design levels of relia-
bility, performance and safety.
2. Accomplishment of this preservation at the minimum
practical costs (in terms of system downtime, man-
power, tools, materials, etc.) based on the criteria
of the user. [Ref. 33]
Unfortunately, the determination of the relevant
costs of RCM is quite difficult. Operational availability
and self-sufficiency of platforms can not be achieved by
translating their components to terms of merely dollars.
In an operational environment any failure which jeopardizes
the safety of the platform or the crew or that threatens
mission accomplishm.ent must be identified as requiring im-
mediate restoral, even though frugal economic criteria may
dictate otherwise. The offsetting benefit of repairing
such a failure must be included in the analysis. As ob-
served by the Lockheed-California Company's study team:
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. . . the optimal allocation of maintenance tasks must
consider other factors than just the minimizing of main-
tenance cost alone. If such factors can be quantified
reliably, even though it be in units other than cost, they
can then be used along with maintenance cost, to identify
the relative acceptability of a maintenance task. The
cost and the benefit aspects of the maintenance task may
take the form of a benefit-to-cost ratio. [Ref . 34]
The RCM approach implies also that the level of
repair cannot be limited to the intermediate or depot level
because organizational level capabilities must be able to
handle the corrective maintenance defined by the RCM philo-
sophy. In this respect RCM becomes all encompassing. Under
its philosophy, defined maintenance actions and the division
of labor between the three established levels are based on
the same methodology whether they be in the form of a pre-
ventive or a corrective maintenance action. This not only
encourages the inclusion of the organizational level into
the realm of corrective maintenance, but also distributes
preventive maintenance tasks throughout all three levels
based on the same cost-effectiveness analysis. The rela-
tionship of preventive and corrective maintenance in the
methodology differs only in that preventive maintenance
analysis leads to the elimination of some tasks, the recate-
gorization of other tasks, or to a recommendation for re-
design. Corrective maintenance analysis always leads to a
maintenance task. These tasks are not eliminated by eco-
nomic or other constraints but are merely reassigned to a
different maintenance level. [Ref. 35]
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Clearly the RCM concept fully supports the Fleet
Commander's in Chief objective of accomplishing maintenance
at the lowest possible level.
Under a philosophy which stresses that an unscheduled
(corrective) task should be performed at the lowest level
of repair in order to maximize availability of the af-
fected unit, the criteria for making this deteinnination
are narrowly defined. Only the accomplishment of those
tasks which by this very nature are incompatible with the
physical construction of the ship or its requirements to
be afloat will be deferred to intermediate or depot level
maintenance facilities. [Ref. 36]
While there are drastic differences between the cur-
rent PMS and RCM philosophies, they both share the same
goal: increased operational availability through material
readiness. This common goal supports the claim that imple-
mentation of RCM will cause little impact on the operating
forces. The actual tools used in PMS accomplishment, such
as the MRCs, will still be used under the RCM methodology.
The change will be that assigned tasks will be minimized to
those essential to failure prevention. The impact of this
will, in most cases, be a decrease in time consumed com-
pleting maintenance tasks which are not mission essential.
An additional change is that under RCM preventive mainten-
ance becomes a subset of corrective maintenance while the
3-M system keeps the two as separate entities. Under RCM,
the effectiveness of preventive maintenance can be measured
by either reduced corrective maintenance or reduced total
maintenance. "Both are driven by the basic principle that
when maintenance of systems is accomplished to a degree
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compatible with safety, and limited only to effective ac-
tions, the ensuing maintenance plan, if properly imple-
mented, will assure high system availability at lowest
expenditures of effort and dollars" [Ref . 37]
.
2 . Benefits of Reliability Centered Maintenance
As was implied earlier, an immediate benefit of RCM
implementation would consist of a savings in maintenance
cost and, in the long term, there would be a definite po-
tential for increased pride from the organizational level
technician. The savings in cost were confirmed by a study
conducted by Lockheed-California Company. A prototype RCM
demonstration was conducted aboard the USS Roark (FF-1053)
.
As a result of the RCM methodology, 26 9 systems and sub-
systems were analyzed and updated MRCs issued. The new
MRCs included only those preventive maintenance tasks that
were considered effective and necessary. Implementation
of these revised MRCs reduced maintenance man-hours and the
number of preventive maintenance tasks by 40 percent. [Ref.
38]
Such savings would also impact on the intermediate
and depot levels. RCM justification for maintenance actions
will eliminate unnecessary periodic rework and overhauls.
"The greatest potential gain from RCM application may come
from the elimination of fixed rework (overhaul) tasks.
Substantial gains may also be achieved by changing on-
condition inspections to failure monitoring tasks where no
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safety-related functions are involved and the failure rate
is high." [Ref. 39]
The other major benefit stems from the increasing
of organizational level capabilities and responsibilities.
By reducing the dependency of the organizational level on
the intermediate and depot levels, the fleet technician will
no longer perform only routine repetitive tasks, but will
gain the freedom to perfect the skills necessary to maximize
operational availability. This promises to instill pride
and create a working environment with a greatly enhanced
probability of job satisfaction which can, in turn, serve
to further increase the level of self-sufficiency obtaina-
ble. However, implementation of RCM requires the caution
that reaping such benefits will require strict adherence to
program requirements . Poor administration and local manage-
ment ineffectiveness will have similar results as did the
implementation of PMS. While RCM logic supports completion
of only tasks which are proven effective, the logic itself
is no substitute for the proper performance of the actual
task in assuring an acceptable level of material readiness.
3. Planned Implementation
The role of RCM in maintenance program development
is defined in MIL-P-24534 (Navy) Appendix F, revised 15
November 1979. Implementation is currently limited to the
preventive maintenance aspect, while corrective maintenance
requirements continue to be governed by the previous LOR
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analysis and 3-M procedures . Preventive maintenance task
development, utilizing the RCM methodology, will be accom-
plished in two ways. First is the development for new sys-
tems and second is the development for existing systems.
Development for new systems requires the inclusion
of the RCM methodology during the conceptual design phase
of ship acquisition, when as part of the logistic support
analysis, various support concepts such as reliability,
availability, maintainability, initial life cycle support
cost goals, and potential logistics problems are being
identified. Inclusion of the RCM analysis at this early
stage permits the maintenance planners to exert the maximum
influence on design so that the ship can truly be designed
to a goal of minimum maintenance.
Development of existing systems is under the cog-
nizance of the PMS Coordinating Activities (the respective
systems command) . The coordinator assigns a developer for
each system under its purview. Qualification for assign-
ment as a developer requires successful completion of an
RCM curriculum approved by the PMS Coordination Activity.
The developer ultimately determines the applicable tasks
that will prevent or detect failure; these will then pro-
vide the basis for the new maintenance plan [Ref . 40] . The
intention of RCM is to "consider the total preventive
maintenance program for a ship, irrespective of the level
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of the maintenance resources assigned to perform the re-
quired tasks" [Ref . 41]
.
The problem with this latter intent lies in its
limited scope of application. The basic premise of the
RCM methodology fully supports the observed trends in the
Navy's maintenance philosophy. Extension of the program to
include corrective maintenance would compliment current pro-
gram initiatives, such as the return to increased organiza-
tional level capabilities, deployment of ATE and the
development of a selective 2-M repair capability at the
organizational level.
C . SUMMARY
The stumbling block to organizational level repair is
an absence of official policy direction. Study efforts and
pilot programs, such as STEEP and the tests on selected
DD-963's are initiated, reviewed and programs implemented
without the coordination necessary to prevent duplication
and misdirection. At the same time, the systems commands
continue to design equipment to a modular replacement con-
cept at the organizational and intermediate levels without
regard to the capabilities established by STEEP, which also
provides for the deployment of ATE to SIMAs, Tenders, SRFs,
and other intermediate maintenance activities with a com-
pletion date of the end of FY84 [Ref. 42] . In fact, this
plan to procure test equipment for the intermediate level
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suggests that an approach to the modular philosophy has
been implemented, even though the NAVMAT study results indi-
cate that a preferred alternative can not be supported by
existing documentation. However, NAVSEA (PMS-306) with
NAVMAT 's approval, accelerated the deployment of ATE from
the end of FY85 to the current date of the end of FY84.
This demonstrated lack of consistency between policy and
actions highlights the dire need for coordination and the
merging of pursuits into a single direction. This lack of
direction coupled with a paucity of test programs and a
proliferation of testers severely limits the effectiveness
of ATE from the onset. Management and coordination are
essential if a new maintenance philosophy is to fare any




There is an evident trend underlay to increase the or-
ganizational level's corrective maintenance capabilities.
Accomplishment of this change in maintenance philosophy-
requires centralized control of maintenance policy and pro-
cedures, coordination of the 2-M and ATE programs, increased
supply support, improved training, and inclusion of other
than cursory economic factors in the level-of-repair
analysis.
The return to an emphasis on the organizational level
performing both preventive and corrective maintenance in no
way entails deemphasizing the intermediate or depot levels
but strives only to alleviate a complete dependency on the
latter for corrective maintenance. This action will in-
crease the purview of the organizational level and will en-
courage a partner-type relationship between all three
levels. This will enhance the probability that problems
will be resolved at the lowest possible level and that there
will be a significant increase in the attainable degree of
self-sufficiency and the efficiency of the three-tiered
maintenance approach. This approach encourages a progres-
sion of capabilities with the depot level performing only
those tasks requiring an industrial capability.
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An overview of the current maintenance structure clearly
supports the need for change. The elements required to
provide the lacking coordination do exist. The strengthen-
ing of the NAVMAT organization, or establishment of some
similar group, to coordinate and enforce the pursuit of a
single maintenance concept would enhance the systems com-
mands' final product. This, coupled with an increased em-
phasis on bridging the gap between the operators and the
planners, should solidify a one-Navy maintenance concept.
The resolution of the "conflict" between a need for self-
sufficiency and the need for economic systems acquisition
must support the acceptance of organizational level main-
tenance, as defined by OPNAVINST 4700. 7F, to include cor-
rective as well as preventive maintenance functions.
Maintenance structural changes must also be made on the
operational side. The extensive impact that this change in
the maintenance concept has on all phases of operations
necessitates the elevation of fleet maintenance coordination
to a level similar to the Pacific Fleet's LOGPAC. It is
this organization that should manage all maintenance support
activities ashore and have a liaison position with each
TYCOM to provide a coordination point for afloat maintenance
support activities. This will ensure that at least one
activity has a total picture of overall fleet maintenance
requirements. Within this "maintenance type command" there
should also be a liaison with representatives of the systems
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commands to provide a bridge between the planners and the
operators. This representative would also be responsible
for determining the type and amount of technical assistance
required. This would consolidate TA into one chain of com-
mand and prevent the duplication of efforts that currently
exists in both fleets.
Consolidation is also required in the management of the
ATE program. Procurement should be limited to a single
tester and a concerted effort needs to be devoted to ex-
panding the number of progrcuns (TPS) available as soon as
possible. Testers without a variety of test programs are
of limited value. Additionally, dollars spent on test
programs will, in the long run, provide a greater return
than dollars spent on the extensive deployment of one or
more types of testers.
Current implementation of the ATE program should also
be restricted to the establishment of deployable teams in
each fleet. V7hile these teams would be permanently attached
to the SIMAs, their mission would include deploying with
tenders and major task forces to provide a fault isolation
capability for deployed units. Support of units in-port
requires that at least one team be retained ashore at all
times. Once a significant TPS library has been established,




Closely related to the ATE program is the 2-M program.
Each fleet unit should have, at the very least, an emergency
2-M repair capability. This capability, coupled with the
deployable ATE team which would accomplish fault isolation
down to the piece part level for all units attached to the
task force, should be more than adequate to support main-
tenance requirements. It is envisioned that 2-M capabili-
ties would progress relative to ship size so that a carrier
would have the equivalent of any other intermediate activity
while a destroyer might only have an emergency repair
capability.
Improved supply support is also needed. The results of
the equipment case studies emphasize this fact. One way
that supply support can be improved is to make as many re-
quirements as possible known to the supply system through
the computer file maintained by the Ship's Parts Control
Center (SPCC) , known as Planned Program Requirements (PPR)
.
Such requirements include both quantity and date needed.
A second way that supply support can be improved is to
consider the interrelationship between repair parts used in
preventive or corrective maintenance action in the develop-
ment of a ship's Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List
(COSAL) . The current COSAL development does not consider
such relationships.
The Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Improvement
Project in NAVSEA is in the process of implementing both of
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these suggestions and the approach is tied to the RCM con-
cept. The first step in the approach is to establish a
bill of materials for each preventive maintenance action.
Then all items in the bill of materials are entered as PPR's
for each scheduled preventive maintenance action expected
during a deployment of the ship (in the private sector this
approach is known as Material Requirements Planning or MRP)
.
A similar approach can be taken for anticipated correc-
tive actions. However, the number of such actions during a
deployment is not known for certain. Therefore some type
of forecasting technique would be appropriate for estimating
the probability of a corrective maintenance action being
needed. A bill of materials will also be more difficult to
develop. Work is currently underway to develop such a bill
at the Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) at Alameda, Califor-
nia in support of depot level repair.
The third way that supply support can be improved is to
make requisition processing as easy as possible for the
user. One such way is to provide the maintenance personnel
with pre-expended bins of materials. Typically this is
done for inexpensive items. Such a bin would be appropriate
for a 2-M station; it could contain all the chips, resis-
tors, capacitors, and other common parts needed in the
repair of circuit boards. Another way is to reduce the
number of interchangeable parts as seen by the user. This
has also been done by the ILS Support Project. A list of
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22,000 items has been consolidated into a list of 2,000
"common" items; each has a special code. A requisition
citing that code can then be used with a cross-reference
file to obtain a part. The latter should be used by the
supply system rather than the maintenance personnel.
Finally, the user must be made aware of the importance
of submitting a requisition to the supply system even if
the part is known to not be available. The demand fore-
casting models used by the supply system need such informa-
tion if the COSAL's are to be as responsive as possible.
Shore-based installations also need to do this. Hopefully,
the approach of reducing the number of interchangeable items
that the XLS Improvement Project has adopted will facilitate
this process.
The case studies are also evidence that the resources
available at the organizational level are not being fully
utilized. The modular replacement philosophy has led to
an underrating of the organizational levels skills which
has in turn lessened the unit technician's responsibilities,
greatly decreasing the challenge and job satisfaction. Fac-
tors such as these decrease the technician's motivation;
this adversely impacts performance leading to a lack of
interest in doing any type of maintenance beyond "swapping
out." Breaking of this vicious circle requires the return
of challenge to the technician's job and the providing of
the fundamental skills necessary to meet that challenge.
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This is the only way that self-sufficiency of platforms can
be guaranteed. Training courses must therefore be designed
to provide the technician with the skills necessary to ac-
complish repair. Teaching component replacement is not
sufficient. Equipping the technician with the basic tech-
niques of troubleshooting, soldering, and fault isolation
is the only way to restore this perceived lack of talent in
the fleet to the capability it should have. The organiza-
tional level has the capability and, when provided with the
adequate training, skills, spare parts, test equipment and
technical manuals, their only maintenance constraint will
be that inherent to the physical limitations of their
platform.
Development of a maintenance plan based on the RCM con-
cept complements the return of emphasis towards the organi-
zational level. Included in the first phases of design,
this methodology provides an LOR analysis based on other
than cost factors. RCM is driven by the basic principle
that, when a maintenance plan is developed with a goal of
achieving a compatible degree of safety with actions limited
to only those proven to be effective, the highest system
availability at the lowest expenditure of resources will be
achieved. It provides a means for developing "total" ship
maintenance programs with the level of repair analysis con-
strained only by the physical limitations of the unit.
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of course, further research is required in all these
areas. The effectiveness of the new maintenance philosophy
hinges on the degree of system support provided. Without
adequate training, spare parts support and the proper tools,
an acceptable level of material readiness cannot be achieved.
Every aspect of the support establishment needs to be
evaluated to determine its impact on maintenance and its
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